MAJOR
GENERAL CARLOS G.R. No. 167103
F.
GARCIA, AFP (RET.),
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
SANDIGANBAYAN and the CARPIO MORALES,
REPUBLIC
OF THE CALLEJO, SR.,
Respondents.
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 31, 2006
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R E S O L U T I O N
Tinga, J.:
The
petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property filed against
petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, and two sons (Garcia, et
al.) before the Sandiganbayan spawned two petitions for certiorari
involving different questions of law.
The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 165835, questioned the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitions for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired property filed under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA 1379). The first petition was decided on
This disposes
of the second petition dated
On
On
On 30
November 2004, Garcia, et al. filed their Opposition[6] to
the Republic’s motion in view of the pendency before this Court of the petition
in G.R. No. 165835.
On
Resolving
the first issue, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it has jurisdiction over
petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 and that the authority to file the
petition for forfeiture of properties unlawfully acquired after 25 February
1986 is lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman.
As to
the second issue, the graft court held that the Motion to Dismiss suffers
from a fatal procedural defect in that it does not comply with the mandatory
provision of Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing. Hence, the motion is a mere scrap of paper
and could not interrupt the running of the period to file an answer due to be
filed not later than
Finally,
it ruled that that the mere filing by Garcia of the petition in G.R. No. 165835
would not automatically warrant the deferment of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, especially where no writ of injunction or restraining order was
issued in the special civil action for certiorari.
On 25
January 2005, Garcia, et al.
filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Admit Attached
Answer,[7] arguing
that the pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 165835 had the effect of holding
in abeyance the proceedings in the forfeiture case before the
Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the
insistence of the Sandiganbayan on technicalities, especially in declaring
Garcia, et al. in
default and allowing presentation of evidence ex parte, would only
pre-empt this Court’s action in G.R. No. 165835. They added that the principle of judicial
courtesy should be applied.
The
Republic filed its Opposition to the motion for reconsideration on 31
January 2005, contending that (a) the motion for reconsideration is not the
proper remedy to obtain relief from a declaration of default; (b) Garcia, et
al. failed to establish any
of the proper grounds for relief from an order of default; and (c) Garcia, et
al. failed to establish that they have a meritorious defense to support
their prayer that the order of default be set aside and their answer admitted.[8]
The Motion
for Reconsideration and/or to Admit Answer was denied on 3 February
2005. The Sandiganbayan ruled the
principle of judicial courtesy is inapplicable to the case since it applies
only when the action of the lower court in the course of its proceedings will
result in rendering moot the very issue brought before the higher court. In the present case, the continuation of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan will not make academic the issue of
jurisdiction raised before the Court in G.R. No. 165835. The Sandiganbayan further noted that the
issue of application of the principle of judicial courtesy to the case was
triggered by petitioner’s act of forum shopping when they filed the petition in
G.R. No. 165835 before this Court simultaneously with the filing of the Motion
to Dismiss before the Sandiganbayan.
In addition, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Admit Attached
Answer does not comply with the requisites in Sec. 3 (b), Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court which prescribes the relief from the order of default:
Sec. 3.
Default; declaration of.— x x x
(b) Relief from order of default. –
A party declared in default may at any time after notice hereof and before
judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set
aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of
justice.
According
to the Sandiganbayan, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Admit
Attached Answer does not show the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that caused their failure to file an answer or that they have a
meritorious defense. Moreover, the
motion contains a defective verification since it was only Garcia who verified
the allegations in the motion when he should have been joined by the other
respondents in the petition for forfeiture, and Garcia’s verification was based
only on “knowledge and belief” and not on “personal knowledge and authentic records.”[9]
Petitioner Garcia then filed the
present Petition to set aside the Resolutions dated
In any
event, petitioner argues that since the Sandiganbayan had denied the Motion
to Dismiss based on the merits, he had less than five (5) days only within
which to file its answer. Since he
received the summons on 2 November 2004, he had until 17 November 2004 to file
his answer. Petitioner filed the motion
to dismiss on the last day. The assailed
resolution of 20 January 2005 was received the following day, 21 January 2006. Hence, he had until
On the
other hand, respondent Republic contends that the Sandiganbayan correctly
declared petitioner in default.
Considering that R.A. No. 1379 does not provide for the procedure in
cases where motions are filed, respondent posits that the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure will apply in a suppletory character.
Hence, as provided in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules,[10] every motion
must be set
for
hearing
on a certain date and the hearing date must not be later than ten (10) days
after the filing of the motion. In
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, the date and time of the hearing are set
beyond the period specified under the Rules, clearly in contravention of the
mandatory character of Sec. 5, Rule 15. The
Republic also finds ludicrous petitioner’s claim that since his Motion to
Dismiss was adjudged by the Sandiganbayan to be a mere scrap of paper and
that such judgment is equivalent to a denial of his Motion to Dismiss,
therefore he may still file his answer. Since the Motion to Dismiss is a
mere scrap of paper, it is as if no pleading was filed within the reglementary
period to file a responsive pleading and therefore did not stop the running of
the period to file his answer. It was then proper to declare petitioner in
default. Having been declared in
default, the Republic further notes, petitioner’s proper course of action would
have been to file a motion to lift the order of default pursuant to Sec. 3 (b),
Rule 9 of the Rules instead of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or To
Admit Attached Answer. Such motion
for reconsideration does not even allege that his failure to file answer was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, nor was he able to
establish that he had a meritorious defense.[11]
The
Republic refutes Garcia’s reliance on Samartino v. Raon[12]
and Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico[13]
to support his contention that courts have admitted responsive pleadings
and appeals which had been filed beyond the reglementary periods for filing the
same.[14] Samartino involved a wrongful
declaration of default by the trial court, based on a defective service of
summons; in the case at bar, Garcia never alleged wrongful service of summons
upon him. Samartino is an
ejectment suit, an action in personam, while the present forfeiture
proceeding is an action in rem. Tan
Tiac Chiong, meanwhile, has no relevance to the case at bar, involving as
it does an administrative matter against a Court of Appeals Associate
Justice. According to respondent, the
reference to these cases only makes it evident that that Garcia is seeking to
overstretch the doctrine on liberal application of the rules by vainly attempting
to apply by analogy the relaxation of the reglementary period for the filing of
appeals.[15] Respondent insists that while the dismissal
of appeals based on purely technical grounds are generally frowned upon, this
is inapplicable to the mandatory requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 15.[16]
The
main issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion. In turn, the resolution of
the issue depends on the determination of whether petitioner was properly
declared in default.
Garcia alleges that the Motion to
Dismiss was timely filed and thus tolled the running of the period to file
an answer and invokes the principle of due process in arguing that the motion
had substantially complied with the Rules and sufficiently notified the adverse
party of the date and time of the hearing on the motion despite the defect in
the notice of hearing. We disagree. To make short shrift of this argument, we
refer to the case of Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals,[17]
also cited by the Sandiganbayan, which holds that
Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules uses the
mandatory
term “must” in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for
hearing, so that a motion that fails to comply with this mandatory provision is
pro forma and does not merit the attention and consideration of the court.[18] In the case at bar, Garcia does not even
refute the fact that the Motion to Dismiss was scheduled for hearing on
3 December 2004, or three (3) days beyond the ten (10)-day period in Sec. 5,
Rule 15. Thus, the motion is a mere
scrap of paper which does not toll the running of the prescriptive period to
file an answer and is not entitled to judicial cognizance.[19]
Garcia then contends that since the
Sandiganbayan had resolved the Motion to Dismiss on the merits by
denying it and ruling on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he had in fact been
given a period of five (5) days to file the pleading. Since his Motion for Reconsideration and/or
to Admit Attached Answer was timely filed, he should not have been declared
in default, he adds.
The argument has no merit. The Motion to Dismiss remains
defective and of no legal effect despite the disposition by the Sandiganbayan
of the issue raised in the motion. The
subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the flaw,
for a motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and
the court has no authority to act thereon.[20] The Sandiganbayan recognized that the motion suffered
from a fatal procedural defect, declaring that “any motion that does not comply
with Sec[.] 5, Rule 15 of the Rules must be regarded as ‘a mere scrap of paper,
should not be accepted for filing, and if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance
and does not affect any reglementary period involved for the filing of the
requisite pleading,’”[21]
but nevertheless addressed the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Error may be imputed to the Sandiganbayan in
delving into the merits of the Motion to Dismiss since the effect of
non-compliance with the requisites for a valid notice of hearing is that the
motion is legally non-existent, that is as if it has never been filed. There is actually no motion which the court
should act upon; it was nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court and
presented no question which the court could decide. But the error is plainly innocuous.
Respondent court’s action on the merits of the motion to dismiss is a
mere surplusage. It does not detract
from or contradict its ruling that the motion to dismiss is a mere scrap of
paper.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan’s
resolution dated 20 January 2005 stands and remains in full force and
effect. Thus, the filing of the Motion
to Dismiss could not and did
not interrupt the running of the period to file an answer. For
failing to answer within the time allowed, Garcia was properly declared in
default upon motion of the Republic.
While Garcia immediately sought
recourse via the Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Admit Attached Answer,
the contentions he raises therein—that the Sandiganbayan should refrain from
exercising jurisdiction over the forfeiture case “out of respect for the
Supreme Court, and so as not to preempt the latter’s action” in G.R. No. 165835
which was then pending, and that the Sandiganbayan’s act of declaring Garcia, et
al. in default is a
play on technicalities that may only render the action of this court in G.R.
No. 165835 moot[22]—do not address
the grounds for which he, his wife and sons were declared in default. His line of reasoning in his motion for reconsideration
is directed towards the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and does not lay
down the considerations for the lifting of the order of default. In fact, as observed by the Sandiganbayan,
the motion for reconsideration fails to comply with the requirements of Sec. 3
(b), Rule 9, which is the proper remedy to lift an order of default. It was as if Garcia considered only the
denial of his Motion to Dismiss, even attaching his answer in the
mistaken belief that he had a fresh period of five (5) days to file the
responsive pleading. It seems Garcia has
not taken into account that portion of the 20 January 2005 Resolution declaring
him and his co-respondents in the forfeiture case in default. Thus, the Sandiganbayan acted properly in
denying the Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Admit Answer.
A final note. The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Republic
of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al.[23]
that in cases where the Sandiganbayan’s
interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, the Sandiganbayan should
continue, not suspend, proceedings before it where no temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by this Court and there is an
absence of a strong probability that the issues raised before this Court would
be rendered moot by the continuation of the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 20
January 2005 and 3 February 2005 are UPHELD.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to resume further proceedings with
deliberate dispatch in accordance with this resolution. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate
Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN.
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo,
pp. 24-40. Penned by
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada
concurring.
[10]SEC. 4. Hearing
of motion.—Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard
and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
SEC. 5. Notice
of hearing.—The notice of hearing shall be
addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.
[11]Comment for respondent Republic
represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, rollo, pp. 175-198.
[15]Comment for respondent Republic
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, rollo, pp.
208-209.
[16]Citing Annie Tan v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314,
[19]Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No.
123340,
[20]Andrada v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31791,
[21]Stated in the assailed Sandiganbayan
Resolution dated